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Abstract
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnec-
ted issues. Voters share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments,
but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts
may occur both between and within voters. Following Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters
(2014), we assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and we want
to determine voting rules which induces an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all
private information. Unlike in judgment aggregation problems with two independent
issues where it is always possible to aggregate information efficiently, efficient inform-
ation aggregation is not always possible with interconnected issues. We characterize
the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, private information, efficient information aggrega-
tion, strategic voting
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1 Introduction
How should a group of individuals form a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on several
issues given judgments of the group members? Judgment aggregation theory focuses
on this question which has wide applications in many collective decision-making bod-
ies, ranging from expert panels to juries, legislative committees to multi-member
courts and so on. A typical example is the problem of the jury in a court trial, where
the jury needs to form a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on whether the defendant
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has broken the contract and whether the contract is legally valid. The collective
judgments on these issues typically determine a third issue, whether the defendant
should be convicted. The issues for which a vote is taken can in principle be ‘mu-
tually interconnected’ in such problems, i.e., a judgment made on one issue may
restrict the judgment on the other. For instance, an expert panel might need to form
‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgments on the two issues of whether the CO2 emissions are above
a given threshold and whether there will be a critical temperature change, where a
‘yes’ judgment on the first issue requires a ‘yes’ judgment on the second issue; the
United Nations security council might need to form judgments on whether a country
will suffer a civil war, and whether it will suffer a severe socio-economic crisis, where
the former implies the latter; the EU commission might need to form judgments on
whether a candidate country implemented benchmark political criteria and whether
the country’s economy is unstable, where the negation of the former implies the latter
and so on. As in the court trial example where the jury convicts the defendant or
not, groups may take an action depending on the collective judgments, such as a large
scale intervention in the UN example or providing additional funds to the candidate
country in the EU commission example.
This paper takes a truth-tracking approach to judgment aggregation problems,
where there are two interconnected issues in the agenda of a committee. We assume
that there is an objective truth to be found, called the state (of the world). Individuals
share a common preference for true (i.e., state-matching) collective judgments, but
hold possibly conflicting private information about the state. We assume strategic
voting, that is, rational behavior in the sense of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
corresponding game and we want to answer the following question: which voting
rules (if any) lead to collective judgments which are efficient given all voters’ private
information? Such voting rules would give incentives for truthful voting, which cannot
be taken for granted even when voters have no conflict of interest. That’s because a
voter can change the collective judgment on an issue only when she is pivotal, and
being pivotal may eliminate the strategic incentive to vote truthfully. This observation
is due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), where they study binary collective choice
problems (which can be seen as a judgment aggregation problem with only one issue)
with common interests and private information, and it gives rise to the analysis and
design of voting rules which lead to truthful behavior of individuals as well as correct
decisions.
We follow the approach of Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014), who aim to de-
termine which voting rules efficiently aggregate all private information in a similar
setting when issues are independent. Given that interconnections are an important
aspect of judgment aggregation theory and they are important in practice, this paper
extends their work to agendas with interconnected issues.1 It turns out that introdu-
1Interconnections are what make judgment aggregation non-trivial in the absence of strategic
behavior, if a social-choice theoretic approach of aiming procedural fairness is taken rather than the
truth-tracking approach. Indeed, if issues are independent, a separate yes/no vote can be taken for
each issue and this never leads to inconsistent collective judgments. On the other hand, with private
information and strategic behavior, the problem of designing a voting rule is non-trivial even if issues
are independent (see Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters, 2014).
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cing interconnections almost reverses the results. While with multiple independent
issues and with a single issue, a voting rule which induces an efficient Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in truthful strategies always exists, with interconnected issues such voting
rule exists only under a strong condition relating the model parameters and prefer-
ences. This partial impossibility arises since information conflicts may occur within
voters when we introduce interconnections. So, an individual might have private in-
formation conflicting the possible state of the world, although it is very unlikely in
our model. When we focus on the specific kind of truth-tracking preferences, we see
how strong the condition is. Under simple preferences where state-matching decisions
are preferred to non-matching ones, it turns out that it is never the case that a voting
rule supports truthful voting. Under consequentialist preferences where a voter prefers
correct group actions to incorrect ones, the impossibility does not persist, although in
almost all cases there is no rule which makes truthful voting an efficient equilibrium.
Whenever it exists, this voting rule accepts both issues only when they are unanim-
ously accepted. When issues are independent, quota rules, which decide each issue
according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular threshold, can
or should be used to guarantee efficient information aggregation. However, in case
of two interconnected issues, there exists no such quota rule. Extending our analysis
to many-issue case is not trivial. The number of possible types of interconnections
and correspondingly, the number of ways to obtain a group action both grow rapidly
with the number of issues and it is not clear how to obtain general results. Moreover,
our impossibility results should persist with more than two issues as the problem gets
much more complicated.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. Section
3 contains a general existence result about efficient aggregation of information for
any kind of common preferences, then focuses on the simple and consequentialist
preferences, analyzing the implications of the general result. All proofs are given in
the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
A judgment aggregation problem is formulated in its present form by List and Pettit
(2002, 2004), while the origins of the problem go back to works by Kornhauser and
Sager (1986, 1993) in the area jurisprudence, to Guilbaud (1966), Wilson (1975) and
Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986). The judgment aggregation literature contains sev-
eral possibility and impossibility results generalizing the observation that majority
judgments can be logically inconsistent (a phenomenon which is referred to as the
discursive dilemma, generalizing Condorcet’s classical voting paradox) when the clas-
sical social-choice theoretic approach is taken (see Dietrich 2006, 2007, 2010, 2015;
Nehring and Puppe 2008, 2010; Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2014; Dietrich and List
2007a, 2008, 2013; Dokow and Holzman 2010a, 2010b; Dietrich and Mongin 2010,
Cuddy and Piggins 2013; for an introductory overview of judgment aggregation the-
ory, see List and Polak 2010). Dietrich and List (2007b) analyze strategic voting
in judgment aggregation but in a setting where voters have private values instead
of private information. See also related work by Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2007).
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Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), List (2005) and Pivato (2011) are few contributions
taking the truth-tracking approach, where they apply the Condorcet Jury Theorem
to judgment aggregation without considering private information and strategic in-
centives. See List and Pettit (2011) for a philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking
approach. This approach is well-established in the literature on binary collective
choice problems, which is about voting on one issue and started with the seminal
works by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). In
this framework, voters are truth-trackers (with some degree of heterogeneity in pref-
erences in the latter work) but they hold private information about what the truth
might be. They show that it need not be rational for all voters to vote truthfully and
taking this into account, they analyze asymptotic efficiency. Their observation gives
rise to their analysis of voting rules which make truthful voting occur in equilibrium.
Several works extend their analysis in different directions: Duggan and Martinelli
(2001) and Meirowitz (2002) consider continuous rather than binary private inform-
ation; Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi (2000) focus
on the unanimity rule in a similar setting and analyze its ability to protect the inno-
cent in jury trials; Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) introduce a pre-voting
deliberation stage when there are biases across voters.
We now discuss papers which combine multiple issue voting with the truth-
tracking approach. The introduction of multiple issues to strategic voting and in-
formation aggregation problems is by Ahn and Oliveros (2012, 2013). While the first
paper considers private values rather than common, the second takes a truth-tracking
approach and is more relevant. They compare the asymptotic efficiency of two differ-
ent mechanisms: a joint trial where both issues are resolved by a majority vote among
the group, and a severed trial where each issue is decided by a majority vote among a
subgroup. They show that neither of these procedures is generally more efficient than
the other one if the group is large enough. Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014) aim
to design voting rules that efficiently use all private information and lead to truthful
voting. Our paper can be seen as an extension of their work to interconnected is-
sues. They find that in most cases, a quota rule should be used to guarantee efficient
information aggregation. In our case, on the other hand, there exists no quota rule
which makes truthful voting efficient. De Clippel and Eliaz (2015) consider a setting
where a group’s optimal action (such as convicting or acquitting the defendant) de-
pends on whether some premises are judged to be true by the group. They compare
premise-based voting with conclusion-based voting. Under the former, a vote is taken
on each issue, and the outcomes determine the group action. Under the latter, the
group votes directly on which action to take, without forming a group view on the
issues. They show that premise-based voting is more efficient than conclusion-based
voting, but that the difference vanishes asymptotically as the group size increases.
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2 The Model
2.1 The judgment aggregation problem
We consider a group of voters, labeled i = 1, ..., n, where n ≥ 2. This group needs
a collective judgment on whether some proposition p or its negation p¯ is true, and
whether some other proposition q or its negation q¯ is true. While doing so, voters
know that the combination {p¯, q¯} is not possible. Hence, the interconnection between
the two propositions is encoded by ‘p¯ → q’.2 The three possible judgment sets
are {p, q}, {p, q¯}, {p¯, q}, abbreviated by pq, pq¯ and p¯q, respectively. Similarly, {p¯, q¯}
is abbreviated by p¯q¯. Each voter votes for a judgment set in J = {pq, pq¯, p¯q}. A
collective decision in J is taken using a voting rule, defined as a function f : J n → J ,
which maps each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision d ≡ f(v).
2.2 Truth-tracking preferences
There is one ‘correct’ judgment set in J , which we call the state (of the world) and
denote by s. The state is unobservable by voters. Voters have identical preferences,
represented by a common utility function u : J × J → R which maps any decision-
state pair (d, s) to its utility u(d, s). The notion of truth-tracking requires the utility
to be high if the decision is correct, however, multiplicity of issues and the structure of
the problem allow for different specifications. We consider two kinds of preferences,
namely, simple and consequentialist preferences. Under simple preferences, voters
want to find out the state-matching decision. The utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d 6= s (incorrect decision). (1)
To define consequentialist preferences, we assume that there are two possible con-
sequences of voting, which represent group action. A consequence function Co maps
the set J to a two-element set of possible consequences. Consider the example of the
EU Commission, having to decide whether to supply additional funds to a candidate
country. This depends on the collective judgments on two issues: p: ‘the country
has implemented its benchmark political criteria’ and q: ‘the country’s economy is
unstable’, where the negation of the former implies the latter. If both issues are
judged to be true, the consequence is to supply the funds, so Co(pq) =‘supply’. If
only one of the issues is judged to be true, then the commission does not see the
country as a good candidate for additional funds since they are either unnecessary
or not deserved; so Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) =‘no supply’. This consequence function with
the property Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) is the only interesting consequence func-
tion up to isomorphism. Consequence functions which lead all decisions to the same
consequence are degenerate and uninteresting. If the consequence function depends
only on the decision between p and p¯ (as in, Co(pq) = Co(pq¯) 6= Co(p¯q)), or only on
2Any other type of interconnection between two issues (except bi-implication) is equivalent to this
one up to isomorphism, so up to interchanging the roles of each proposition by its negation. Hence,
studying this interconnection, we cover all possible interconnections between two propositions (except
bi-implication, which is a trivial case).
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the decision between q and q¯ (as in, Co(pq) = Co(p¯q) 6= Co(pq¯)), then the problem
reduces to making a judgment on a single proposition-negation pair which has already
been studied in the literature on binary collective choice with common interests. We
define the consequentialist utility function as
u(d, s) =
{
1 if Co(d) = Co(s) (correct consequence)
0 if Co(d) 6= Co(s) (incorrect consequence). (2)
Simple preferences may describe an environment where judgments on issues do
not necessarily lead to a consequence or action, or where voters want to reach the
right action through correct reasons. Note that incorrect decisions may lead to correct
consequences. On the other hand, under consequentialist preferences, voters want to
reach the correct consequence no matter whether the underlying premises are correct
or not.
2.3 Private information and strategies
Each voter has a type, which is an element of T = {pq, pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯} and is denoted by t
generically. A voter’s type represents evidence about whether p is true and whether q
is true. For instance, the type t = pq¯ represents evidence for p and for q¯, and the type
t = p¯q¯ represents evidence for p¯ and for q¯, which overall is conflicting information3
since p¯q¯ 6∈ J . We write t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T n for a profile of voters’ types.
Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) in J ×T n according to a probability
measure denoted Pr. The prior probability of state s ∈ J is denoted
pis = Pr(s)
and is assumed to be in the interval (0, 1).4 If a proposition r ∈ {p, p¯, q, q¯} represents
(part of) voter i’s type rather than (part of) the true state, we often write ri for r.
We write Pr(pi|p) for the probability that voter i has evidence for p given that p is
true. The probability of getting evidence for r given that r is true is denoted
ar = Pr(ri|r)
and by assumption belongs to (1/2, 1) and does not depend on the voter i.
We assume voters’ types are independent given the state. Moreover, given the
truth about p (i.e., either p or p¯), a voter’s evidence about p (i.e., either pi or p¯i)
is independent of the truth and the evidence about q; and similarly, given the truth
3The problem of conflicting private information may occur when voters draw their information
from different sources (such as different experts or data sets) for each issue. Conflicting private
information occurs only with low probability in the model.
4Note that there is some restriction on these prior probabilities due to the interconnection between
two propositions. Let sr denote the value of proposition r ∈ {p, q} in the state s and pir denote the
probability of r ∈ {p, q} being true. Then, Pr(sp = p¯|sq = q¯) = Pr(sq = q¯|sp = p¯) = 0, which imposes
the following structure on the prior probabilities: pipq = pip + piq − 1, pipq¯ = 1− piq and pip¯q = 1− pip.
We can alternatively express our results in terms of prior probabilities of propositions rather than
states.
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about q, a voter’s evidence about q is independent of the truth and the evidence
about p. The joint distribution of the state and the types is then given by
Pr(s, t) = Pr(s)×
n∏
i=1
Pr(ti|s).
Each voter votes for a judgment in J based on her type. A (voting) strategy is a
function σ : T → J , mapping each type t ∈ T to the type’s vote v = σ(t). We write
σ = (σ1, ...., σn) for a profile of voters’ strategies. We say that a strategy profile σ is
efficient if for every type profile t, the resulting decision d = f(σ1(t1), ..., σn(tn)) is
efficient, i.e., has maximal expected utility conditional on full information t. We as-
sume that a decision in J is efficient for some type profile. We exclude efficiency ties,
i.e., those special parameter combinations such that some type profile leads to differ-
ent efficient decisions (with different consequences when we assume consequentialist
preferences). Hence, we exclude those instances where a voter is indifferent between
two decisions except in the case that these decisions lead to the same consequence.
Our aim, besides efficiency, is to obtain truthful voting behavior in equilibrium.
We mean informative voting by truthful behavior. We say that a strategy σ of a voter
is informative if σ(t) = t for all t ∈ T \ {p¯q¯} and σ(p¯q¯) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. Hence, a voter
with informative strategy votes for her type if her type is non-conflicting, while she
partly follows it when she has the conflicting evidence t = p¯q¯. Here, informativeness
is open to behavior: one can choose between pq¯ and p¯q under conflicting evidence.
In a setting where information is never conflicting, following the evidence would be
simply voting for the type. An informative voter in our setting follows the evidence
as much as possible.5
3 A general (im)possibility
Given the setting described above, can we design voting rules which lead to efficient
decisions as well as simple-minded, truthful voting behavior in equilibrium? For a
rule to induce simple-minded, truthful behavior, informative voting should be rational
in equilibrium, i.e., the profile of informative strategies must be a Nash equilibrium
of the corresponding Bayesian game. Following a well-known result by McLennan
(1998), for any voting rule, an efficient strategy profile is an equilibrium, and our
objective is reduced to finding out when informative voting is efficient. Note that
informative voting being efficient means that for any given type profile t, every profile
of corresponding informative strategies is efficient.
There always exist voting rules which make informative voting efficient when
we consider multiple issue setting with no interconnections as Bozbay, Dietrich and
Peters (2014) show. However, it turns out that this result does not persist when we
introduce interconnections between the issues. Informative voting is efficient only
under a strong condition over the model parameters.
5An alternative way to define informative strategy might be to impose voters with conflicting
types to vote for the judgment set with the highest expected utility given the conflicting type, or
to completely ignore the private information and vote for the judgment set with the highest prior
probability. Our result for general preferences do not change under both definitions.
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Condition 1: For any t, t′ ∈ T n, if {i : ti = pq} = {i : t′i = pq}, then some decision
d ∈ J is efficient for both t and t′.
Theorem 1 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J 2 → R. There
exists a voting rule for which informative voting is efficient if and only if Condition
1 holds.
This condition is clearly strong: it requires that for all type profiles where the
same group of voters have type pq, there must be a common efficient decision. We
now narrow our focus to the specific kind of preferences to see further implications
of this condition. We study simple and consequentialist preferences in turn in the
following subsections, so that we can say more about the nature of voting rules making
informative voting efficient whenever the condition is satisfied.
3.1 Simple preferences
We start by addressing simple preferences, defined by (1), where correct decisions are
preferred to incorrect ones. By focusing on simple preferences, can we say more than
the (partial) existential claim of Theorem 1? Here is the answer, which states the
impossibility of efficient information aggregation under simple preferences.
Theorem 2 Under simple preferences, there exists no voting rule for which inform-
ative voting is efficient.
It turns out that Condition 1 never holds under simple preferences. This result is
not surprising as we now illustrate. Consider two type profiles t, t′ where only voter
1 receives evidence for pq. Suppose further, all other voters in t have evidence for
pq¯ while all other voters in t′ have evidence for p¯q. Condition 1 requires that there
is a common efficient decision for both type profiles, while this seems too demanding
since the two type profiles are almost opposite to each other.
3.2 Consequentialist preferences
Does the impossibility we obtain for simple preferences persist under consequentialist
preferences? We state our answer to this question after defining the following two
coefficients.
A := pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1 ap¯
1− ap ,
B := pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1 aq¯
1− aq + pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
.
Theorem 3 Under consequentialist preferences, there exists a voting rule for which
informative voting is efficient if and only if the decision pq is efficient only for the
unanimous type profile t = (pq, ..., pq) (which is the case if and only if A,B > pipq).
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The theorem states that informative voting can be efficient under consequentialist
preferences if pq is the efficient decision only when there is perfect evidence for pq.
This is what Condition 1 reduces to under consequentialist preferences. To satisfy
this condition, the prior probability of pq should be sufficiently low compared to prior
probabilities of pq¯ and p¯q. For instance, if pipq = 0.2, pipq¯ = pip¯q = 0.4, ap = aq =
ap¯ = aq¯ = 0.6 and n = 3, such a voting rule exists whereas no voting rule makes
informative voting efficient if instead pipq = 0.3 and pipq¯ = pip¯q = 0.35. We present a
simple characterization of voting rules which make informative voting efficient when
the condition is satisfied.
Proposition 1 Assume consequentialist preferences and Condition 1. A voting rule
f : J n → J makes informative voting efficient if and only if for every voting profile
v ∈ J n, the decision f(v) = pq if v = (pq, ..., pq) and f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} otherwise.
Proposition 1 describes a class of voting rules which accept pq only when there is
unanimous agreement about both issues being true. Some of these rules characterized
by Proposition 1 satisfy some natural properties which we define below:
• Anonymity: For all voting profiles (v1, ..., vn) ∈ J n and all permutations (i1, ...,
in) of the voters, f(vi1 , ..., vin) = f(v1, ..., vn).
• Monotonicity: For all voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n, if for each r in f(v) the voters
who accept r in v also accept r in v′, then f(v′) = f(v). This property implies
that increasing the support for the accepted proposition does not reverse the
acceptance.
• Neutrality: For all voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n for which there is no permutation
(i1, ..., in) of the voters with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n), if for every voter i the
vote vi contains p if and only if the vote v
′
i contains q, then f(v) contains p if and
only if f(v′) contains q. Informally, the two issues are treated symmetrically.
While some of the voting rules described in Proposition 1 are anonymous, mono-
tonic and neutral, others fail to satisfy any of these properties. Once we impose
anonymity, monotonicity and neutrality on the voting rules characterized in Propos-
ition 1, we obtain the voting rule satisfying the following conditions as we state in
our next proposition. For each v ∈ J n,
f(v) = pq ⇐⇒ nvp = nvq = n (3)
f(v) = pq¯ if nvp > n
v
q (4)
f(v) = p¯q if nvp < n
v
q (5)
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} if nvp = nvq < n (6)
Proposition 2 Assume consequentialist preferences. A voting rule f : J n → J
which makes informative voting efficient is anonymous, monotonic and neutral if and
only if it belongs to the class of rules defined by (3)-(6).
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Among the efficient aggregation possibilities, anonymity, monotonicity and neut-
rality can be attained. Note that the property of independence, which imposes that
the decision on each proposition r ∈ {p, q} only depends on the votes on r, is not sat-
isfied by any rule defined in Proposition 2. This rules out quota rules6 which are very
common in the literature and which, given the optimal acceptance thresholds, almost
always lead to efficient information aggregation when issues are independent or when
there is a single issue. Following Proposition 1, we have the following corollary which
points out the contrast between our results and those of independent issues.
Corollary 1 There exists no quota rule f : J n → J making informative voting
efficient.
This corollary applies to both kind of preferences as we already have a general
impossibility in the case of simple preferences. The possibility of efficient informa-
tion aggregation under consequentialist preferences rely mostly on the indifference of
voters between the two judgment sets pq¯ and p¯q. The judgment sets pq¯ and p¯q both
lead to the same consequence, so the same utility for each consequentialist voter.
Consider a type profile t with ti = pq¯ for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and a type profile t′ with
t′i = p¯q for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Condition 1, the existence condition for efficient inform-
ation aggregation, would require that the efficient decision for both t and t′ is the
same. This is of course not possible under simple preferences, while it follows under
consequentialist preferences.
In the context of consequentialist preferences, our results raise the question of
whether aggregating judgments on the consequence (or conclusion) rather than the
underlying issues (or premises) would suffice for efficient information aggregation pur-
poses. When issues are independent, it leads to valuable information loss to focus
only on the consequence since an efficient mechanism uses all available information.
See De Clippel and Eliaz 2015, for comparison of conclusion-based and premise-based
procedures in their ability to efficiently aggregate information. However, our results
show that the efficient mechanism – whenever it exists – does not distinguish between
pq¯ and p¯q which lead to the same consequence. A conclusion-based procedure where
a yes/no vote is taken only on the consequence would equally be efficient if a ‘yes’
judgment is made if and only if all voters vote ‘yes’ under consequentialist prefer-
ences in our framework. This implies another stark difference between implications
of interconnected and independent issues. We want to conclude with the following
remark motivated by our results.
Remark 1 Informative voting is not efficient almost in all cases with an agenda with
mutually interconnected propositions.
6Formally, a quota rule is given by two thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0, 1, ..., n+1} with mp +mq ≤ n+1,
and for each voting profile it accepts p [q] if and only if at least mp [mq] voters accept it in the profile.
The additional requirement of mp + mq ≤ n + 1 is for leaving out p¯q¯ from possible outcomes. This
requirement follows from Theorem 2(c) in Dietrich and List (2007c). Quota rules are monotonic,
anonymous and independent, but not necessarily neutral. Whenever the acceptance thresholds for
propositions are equal, they turn out to be neutral.
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A Appendix: proofs
We introduce some preliminary derivations before we prove our results. The prob-
ability of the three states in J conditional on the full information t ∈J n is given as
follows, where k is the number of types that contain p in t and l is the number of
types that contain q in t.
Pr(pq|t) = pipqa
k
p(1− ap)n−kalq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
(7)
Pr(pq¯|t) = pipq¯a
k
p(1− ap)n−k(1− aq¯)lan−lq¯
Pr(t)
(8)
Pr(p¯q|t) = pip¯q(1− ap¯)
kan−kp¯ alq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
. (9)
Note that our assumption that p¯q¯ cannot be the state of the world imposes the
following structure on the prior probabilities: pipq = pip + piq − 1, pipq¯ = 1 − piq and
pip¯q = 1 − pip. We use prior probabilities of states instead of prior probabilities of
propositions in our derivations for simplicity of notation.
We are now ready to prove our results.
Proof of Theorem 1. To start with, we introduce some notation. Given a voting
profile v, let Θ(v) denote the set of all type profiles which possibly lead to v under
informative voting. Given a type profile t, let Ω(t) denote the set of all voting
profiles which possibly result from t under informative voting. Consider a voting rule
f : J n → J .
(1) First, let Condition 1 hold. Suppose there is an exogenously given ordering
of judgment sets, and let f be the following voting rule: for all v ∈ J n, f(v) =
d ⇐⇒ d is the highest ordered decision among all decisions which are efficient for
some t ∈ Θ(v). Consider any type profile tˆ ∈ T n and suppose informative voting.
We want to show that (∗) for each v ∈ Ω(ˆt), f(v) is efficient for tˆ. Let v ∈ Ω(ˆt).
One can show that all type profiles in Θ(v) share the same subvector restricted to pq.
Since Condition 1 holds, there is some decision d which is efficient for all t ∈ Θ(v),
including tˆ. It follows from Condition 1 that if any other decision d′ 6= d is efficient
for some t ∈ Θ(v), it is efficient for all t ∈ Θ(v). Then, (∗) holds.
(2) Conversely, let f make informative voting efficient. Let t, t′ be two type
profiles in T n with {i : ti = pq} = {i : t′i = pq}. One has to show that (∗∗) there is
d ∈ J which is efficient for both t, t′. By construction, for each v ∈ Ω(t), t′ ∈ Θ(v);
and similarly, for each v′ ∈ Ω(t′), t ∈ Θ(v′). Then, f(v) must be efficient for t′ (as
well as t) and f(v′) must be efficient for t (as well as t′) since informative voting is
efficient. So, (∗∗) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, it is sufficient to show that Condition 1
never holds under simple preferences. Suppose for a contradiction, it holds. Consider
the two type profiles t = (pq¯, ..., pq¯) and t′ = (p¯q, ..., p¯q). Since {i : ti = pq} = {i :
t′i = pq} and Condition 1 holds, there is a decision which is efficient for both profiles.
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Then, pq¯ must be efficient for t since otherwise pq¯ would not be efficient for any
type profile which contradicts to non-degeneracy assumption. Similarly, p¯q must be
efficient for t′. Hence, pq¯ and p¯q are both efficient given t or t′, which contradicts to
no-efficiency ties assumption. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let the condition in Theorem 3 (that pq is only efficient for
the unanimous type profile t = (pq, ..., pq)) be called Condition 2.
(1) We first prove that Condition 2 implies that there is a voting rule for which in-
formative voting is efficient and A,B > pipq. Assume Condition 2 holds. This implies
that Condition 1 holds. By Theorem 1, there is a voting rule which makes informative
voting efficient. Let t, t′ be type profiles with one pq¯ and one p¯q respectively while
each of the rest of the types is pq. Without loss of generality, let t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and
t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯). By Condition 1, pq¯, p¯q are both efficient for each of the type profiles.
Using (7) and (9), we can write the following:
E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) (10)
⇔pipq¯an−1p (1− ap)(1− aq¯)n + pip¯q(1− ap¯)n−1ap¯anq > pipqan−1p (1− ap)anq (11)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1( ap¯
1− ap
)
> pipq. (12)
Similarly,
E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′) (13)
⇔pipq¯anp (1− aq¯)n−1aq¯ + pip¯q(1− ap¯)nan−1q (1− aq) > pipqanpan−1q (1− aq) (14)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1( aq¯
1− aq
)
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
> pipq. (15)
So, A,B > pipq.
(2) We now prove that if there is a voting rule for which informative voting is
efficient, Condition 2 holds. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J and suppose f makes
informative voting efficient. By Theorem 1, Condition 1 holds. Given a type profile
t ∈ T n, let Γ(t) denote the set of type profiles which have the same subvector on pq
as in t. Let ntr denote the number of occurrences for a proposition r in a type profile
t. Now, take a type profile tˆ ∈ T n with k times pq where 1 ≤ k < n. The proof
proceeds in several steps.
Claim 1: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(tˆ) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
Any type profile with k times pq and n − k times p¯q¯ satisfies this condition and
one of these type profiles is obviously in Γ(tˆ). Now, take t˜ ∈ T n with k− 1 times pq.
Claim 2: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(t˜) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
One can easily see there is always a type profile with the exact same pq structure
as t˜ and with only one occurrence of pq¯ and only one occurrence of p¯q.
Claim 3: Under consequentialist preferences, for all t, t′ ∈ T n with ntp = nt
′
p and
ntq = n
t′
q , E(u(d, S)|t) = E(u(d, S)|t′) for each d ∈ J .
The claim follows from the expressions (7)-(9). By Condition 1, there is a decision
d ∈ J which is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ). Similarly, there is a decision d ∈ J which
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is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Combining Claim 1, 2 and 3, one obtains that the same
decision d ∈ J is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ) and all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Since this is true for all k
with 1 ≤ k < n, there is a decision d which is efficient for all t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
By non-degeneracy assumption, pq is efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). Hence, d must be
in {pq¯, p¯q} since otherwise pq would be efficient for all type profiles which contradicts
to non-degeneracy assumption. Hence, Condition 2 holds.
(3) We finally prove that A,B > pipq implies Condition 2. Let A,B > pipq. We
first prove the following claim.
Claim 4: The expected utility of pq given a type profile t is an increasing function
of ntp and n
t
q.
The claim follows from the definition of the utility function and from Pr(S = pq|t)
being an increasing function of ntp and n
t
q. Let t, t
′ ∈ T n be type profiles with
one pq¯ and one p¯q respectively while each of the rest of the types is pq. Without
loss of generality, let t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯). By (7) and (9), one
has E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) and E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′). By Claim
4, it follows that E(u(pq¯, S)|t) = E(u(p¯q, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) for all t ∈ T n \
{(pq, ..., pq)} which means pq¯, p¯q are efficient for each t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}. Thus,
Condition 2 holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . Proof of the ‘if’
part is obvious and left to the reader. To show converse, let f make informative
voting efficient. Note that Condition 1 reduces to decision pq being only efficient
for the unanimous type profile t = (pq, ..., pq) under consequentialist preferences
by Theorem 3. Then, for all voting profiles obtained by informative voting from
any t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}, f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. By non-degeneracy assumption, pq is
efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). By f making informative voting efficient, f(v) = pq if
v = (pq, ..., pq). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . Let nvr denote the
number of occurrences of r ∈ {p, q} in a voting profile v.
(1) First, let f be defined by (3)-(6). Clearly, f is anonymous. It follows from
Proposition 1 that informative voting is efficient with f since for all v ∈ J n, f(v) = pq
if and only if nvp = n
v
q = n; so, if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq). To show monotonicity
of f , take two voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such that for all r ∈ f(v), the voters who
vote for r in v also vote for r in v′.
Case 1: f(v) = pq. Then v = (pq, ..., pq). By definition, v′ = v and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. The definition of f implies either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n;
and the definition of v′ implies nv′p ≥ nvp and nv
′
q ≤ nvq . Suppose nvp > nvq . Then,
nv
′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯. Next, suppose nvp = nvq < n. If v′ 6= v, one has nv
′
p > n
v
p
or nv
′
q < n
v
q which means n
v′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯.
Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
It remains to show neutrality of f . Take two voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such
that vr = v
′
r′ for every distinct r, r
′ ∈ {p, q} and there is no permutation of voters
(i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). We have to show that (*) f accepts r in v
if and only if f accepts r′ in v′. We distinguish 3 cases:
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Case 1: f(v) = pq. It is clear that v′ = v, and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. By definition of f , either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n. One
can see that the latter is not possible since then one could find a permutation of
voters (i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). Suppose n
v
p > n
v
q . By definition of
v′, whenever p (q) is accepted in v, q (p) is accepted in v′. This means nv′p < nv
′
q
and f(v′) = p¯q. So, f accepts p in v and q in v′, and it accepts q¯ in v and p¯ in v′.
Hence, (*) holds.
Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
(2) Conversely, let f be anonymous, monotonic and neutral, and make informative
voting efficient. We have to show that (∗) f is defined by (3)-(6). By Proposition
1 and informative voting being efficient, f(v) = pq if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq),
equivalently nvp = n
v
q = n. Now, take a voting profile v ∈ J n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
Case 1: nvp > n
v
q . Suppose for a contradiction, f(v) = p¯q. Let v
′ be a voting
profile with nv
′
p = n
v
q and n
v′
q = n
v
p . We start by proving the following claim.
Claim: For each combination of k, l ∈ {0, ..., n}, there is only one voting profile
v ∈ J n with nvp = k and nvp = l up to the permutations of votes.
The claim follows from the fact that all votes containing p¯ are p¯q, and similarly, all
votes containing q¯ are pq¯. Hence, subtracting number of p (q) occurrences in a profile
from n gives the exact number of p¯q (pq¯) votes. Then, there is only one voting profile
with nvp times q and n
v
q times p up to permutations of votes. Hence, by neutrality and
anonymity, f(v′) = pq¯. However, by monotonicity of f , f(v′) = p¯q since nv′p ≤ nvp
and nv
′
q ≥ nvq , a contradiction. Then, f(v) = pq¯.
Case 2: nvp < n
v
q . One can show that f(v) = p¯q analogously to Case 1.
Case 3: nvp = n
v
q < n. By Proposition 1 and informative voting being efficient,
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}.
So, (∗) is true. 
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